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Devarajan and Rodrik develop a simple, formal  may deviate from that of the private sector).  In
framework for clarifying thc tradeoffs involved  non-CFA countries, the private sector raises its
in choosing between a fixed and flexible cx-  prices, anticipating the govemment's capricious
change rate system.  They apply this framework  usc of the exchange rate. The higher prices, in
to the countries of Africa's CFA Zone, which  turn, force the goverment  to devaluc-  and
have maintained fixed parity with the French  inflation results.
franc since independence.
By contrast, the fixed cxchange rate of the
Because a few agricultural products and  CFA Zone acts as a credible commitment.  The
natural resources dominate their exports, mem-  government "ties its own hands" so that it will
ber countries of Africa's CFA Zone have suf-  not be tempted to use the exchange rate, thereby
fered frequent shocks in terms of trade.  A  eliciting lower wage and price increases from the
flexible exchange rate could possibly have  private sector.
alleviated the costs of these extemal shocks.  On
the other hanid,  CFA member countries !-ive  Weighing this benefit against the cosLs  of
managed to maintain lower inflation lcvels than  nonadjustmcnt to extemal shocks, Devarajan and
their neighbors.  The framework Devarajan and  Rodrik conclude - from some highly simplified
Rodrik have devised provides a way to weigh  . lculations  - that fixed exchange rates have
these costs and benefits.  been a bad bargain for the CFA member coun-
tries.  Under reasonable tradeoffs between output
The inflation differential between CFA and  and inflation, these countries would have been
non-CFA African countries has been about 14  better off having the flexibility to adjust to
percentage points.  Devarajan and Rodrik  external shocks.
attribute this differential to the problems faced
by countries with discretion over their exchange-  Their conclusion is qualified by some of the
rate policy - namely, that the government  other benefits of Zone mcmbership as well as by
cannot credibly commit against using this  the stylized naturc of their framework.
instrument to pursue its own objectives (which
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Winters,  and  confercnce  participants  for comments.DO THE BENEFITS  OF FIXED  EXCHANGE  RATES  OUTWEIGH  THEIR  COSTS?
THE  FRANC  ZONE  IN  AFRICA
Shantayanan  Devarajan  and  Dani  Rodrik
A primary  reason  for structural  adjustment  in  agricultu:e  is the  wide
fluctuation  in the  world  prices  of agricultural  commodities,  which  cause  sharp
swings  in the terms  of trade  of  countries  that  rely  on these  commodities  for
their  export  earnings. A key instrumenc  in structural  adjustment  is the
exchange  rate.  How and  whether  this  instrument  is  used,  however,  depends  on
the "rules  of the  game,"  that  is,  the  particular  exchange-rate  regime  the
country  is in.  This  paper  addresses  the  question  of  how small,  open  economies
that  are subject  to sharp  swings  in  their  terms  of trade  should  select  an
appropriate  exchange  rate  regime. We develop  a framework  to clarify  the
trade-offs  involved,  and  apply  it to the  CFA  Zone  countries  in  Africa,  which
have  maintained  a fixed  parity  with  the  French  Franc  since  independence.
Thanks  to the  predominance  of a few  agricultural  products  and  natural
resources  in their  exports,  CFA  member  countries  have suffered  frequent  shocks
in their  terms  of trade. A flexible  exchange  rate  could  have  possibly
alleviated  the  output  costs  of these  external  shocks. On the  other  hand,  a
fixed  exchange  rate  has enabled  these  countries  to  maintain  lower  inflation
levels  than their  neighbors. Our framework  provides  a  way of  weighing  these
costs  and  benefits. Using  our  model  as a guide,  we investigate  whether  their
choice  of a fixed  exchange  rate  was (and  remains)  a  wise one.
I. The Issues
The selection  of an appropriate  exchange-rate  regime  has  aroused
considerable  academic  interest  over the  last three  decades,  and the  answers
provided  have shifted  with  academic  fashions.' Throughout  much  of the  1950s-2-
and 1960s,  in line  with prevailing  wisdom  (and  practice)  in the international
monetary  system  as a whole,  developing  countries  maintained  fixed  exchange
rates. More flexible  arrangements  started  to  become  commonplace  by the late
1960s  and  1970s. As the  currencies  of industrial  countries  started  to float
vis-a-vis  each other  after  1971,  flexibility  became  a necessity:  pegging  to
any  of the  major  currencies  implied  floating  against  others. During  the
1980s,  exchange-rate  flexibility  continued  to  gain  ground  among  developing
countries. In particular,  many governments  experimented  with  market-based
exchange  rate  regimes,  such  as auction-based  systems,  interbank  markets,  or
pure floats.
But  by the  mid-1980s,  the  tide  turned. Floating  exchange  rates  began  to
lose  much  of their  lustre  in the  eyes  of industrial-country  policy  makers.
The  wide gyrations  of the  dollar  during  the  1980s  and  the  short-term
volatility  of the  key  currencies  eroded  confidence  in  markets'  ability  to
foster  adjustment  with no (or  little)  tears. The  Europeans  linked  their
currencies  tighter,  and  proposals  to limit  flexibility  became  widespread. In
many parts  of the  developing  world,  exchange-rate  flexibility  became  another
name for  inflation. In  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Argentina,  Mexico,  Israel  and  Poland,
governments  introduced  stabilization  programs  based  on fixed  exchange  rates.
There  are  basically  two  ways of look'.ng  at exchange  rates,  with divergent
implications  for  desirable  exchange  rate  regimes. Borrowing  Corden's  (1990)
terminology,  we can call  these  the  "real  targets"  approach  and  the "nominal
anchor"  approach. The  real  targets  school  views the  exchange  rate  as an
indispensable  policy  instrument  in  attaining  equilibrium  in the  "real"-3-
economy,  such  as in  domestic  activity,  the  current  account,  or the rate  of
growth. This is the  view of the  exchange  rate  embedded  in  the textbook
exposition  of the  dependent  economy  model  with its  juxtaposition  of
expenditure  switching  (i.e.,  devaluation)  and  expenditure  changing  (i.e.,
fiscal  policy)  as the two  independent  policies  needed  to  achieve  the  twin
goals  of internal  and  external  balance. The  real targets  approach  inevitably
leads  to an activist,  discretionary  stance. The exchange  rate  has to be
managed  flexibly:  the  authorities  need to respond  to external  shocks  (such  as
terms  of trade  changes)  or domestic  price  shocks  by undertaking  the  requisite
combination  of expenditure-switching  (i.e.,  exchange  rate)  and  expenditure-
changing  policies  to reattain  macroeconomic  equilibrium.
Implicit  in the  real  targets  approach  are  two  notions:  first,  that  the
macroeconomy  cannot  be relied  on to  generate  on its  own  the  real exchange  rate
changes  required  by shocks  to the  system;  second,  that  a nominal  devaluation
will  have real  effects  (i.e.,  it  will lead  to  a depreciation  of the  the  real
exchange  rate),  at least  in the  short-  to  medium-run. These  two  notions  of
how the  economy  works  are  encapsulated  in the  textbook  model  by the  assumption
that  home-good  prices  are rigid  (upward  as  well as  downward).  Putting  the  two
together,  we obtain  the  activist  role  for  the  exchange  rate  called  for  by the
real targets  approach.
The  alternative,  nominal  anchor  approach  is  based  on a rejection  of the
efficacy  of nominal  exchange  rate  adjustments.  The case  for  this  approach  can
be constructed  at several  levels. At the  simplest  level,  one  can  deny  the
effectiveness  of nominal  devaluations  in achieving  real  depreciations,  thereby-4-
denying  flexibility  of the  currency  any  serious  economic  purpose. But  even if
it is  granted  that  nominal  exchange  rate  policy  has some  power  in the  short-
to  medium-run,  it is  possible  to  argue  that  the  inflationary  costs  are  high
enough  to render  it  a bad  bargain. The  passthrough  from  the  exchange  rate  to
domestic  prices  arises  from  the  openness  of the  economy  and/or  from  the
effective  indexing  of home  goods  prices  to the  value  of the  currency. When
the  passthrough  coefficient  is  below  unity  but  high,  nominal  exchange  rate
changes  large  enough  to  be "effective"  in the  sense  of the  real targets
approach  will come  at the  cost  of  unacceptable  jumps  in domestic  prices.
A more  recent  strand  of theorizing  has added  a  new twist  to the  nominal
anchor  approach. The  literature  spawned  by the  discovery  of rational
expectations  has stressed  that the  policy  regime  in  place  will shape  the  way
the  private  sector  sets  wages  and  prices  in the  economy. In a flexible-rate
regime,  domestic  price  setters  will take  into  account  the  policymakers'
incentive  to alter  the  nominal  exchange  rate  in order  to achieve  some "real"
objective,  an incentive  that  typically  undercuts  the  price  setters'  desire  to
maintain  their  relative  prices. Moreover,  any  pronouncement  that  the
authorities'  discretion  over  the  exchange  rate  will  not  be "abused"  is  not
credible  for  standard  time-inconsistency  reasons,  as long  as the  value  of the
currency  can  be adjusted  at more frequent  intervals  than  wages  and  domestic
prices. Consequently,  the  economy  will settle  at a high rate  of inflation,
with  no guarantee  that the  authorities  will  end  up any  closer  to their  real
targets. In this  view,  then,  exchange-rate  flexibility  has a cost  and  no
benefits. It is better  to  give  up discretion  and subscribe  to a fixed-5-
exchange  rate  regime,  thereby  "anchoring"  the  domestic  price  level. 2
Clearly,  both approaches  capture  some  of the  reality  in  developing
countries,  and  neither  can  be judged  right  or wrong  in the  abstract. The
weight  of arguments  on the  two  sides  will  depend  on the  particulars  of each
case. Here,  we will lay  out a simple,  formal  framework  which  captures  the
essence  of the  arguments  listed  above  and  provides  guidance  as to  how the
weighting  of pros and  cons  can  be done  explicitly.  We will then  apply  the
framework  to the  African  member  countries  of the  CFA  Franc  Zone. We will  ask:
knowing  what  we do about  their  terms-of-trade  hictory  and their  (as  -well  as
their  neighbors')  performance  over the  last  three  decades,  did their  decision
to join  a currency  union  with France  make sense?
II.  The  CFA Zone
The  CFA Franc  Zone  consists  of thirteen  African  countries  which 3 are
divided  into  two  currency  unions:  the  Union  Monetaire  Ouest  Africaine  and  the
members  of the  Banque  des Etats  de l'Afrique  Centrale. Each  union  issues  its
own  currency. Since  both currencies  are  the  CFA  Franc,  the  two  unions  are
referred  to  jointly  as the "CFA  Franc  Zone."
The Zone is  an extension  of the  monetary  authority  which  governed  these
former  French  colonies  prior  to independence.  In the  late  1950s,  the  two
currency  unions  were set  up,  and  the  newly-independent  Francophone  countries
of Africa  were given  the  option  of  joining. All  but  Guinea,  Madagascar  and
Mauritania  did. 4 Membership  in the  Zone  afforded  these  countries  the
opportunity  to  pool their  foreign  exchange  reserves. In addition,  the  Zone
was governed  by certain  rules  which  could  be interpreted  as a means  of guiding-6-
monetary  policy  in these  fEedgling  nation-states.5  First,  government
borrowing  from the  Central  Bank  could  not exceed  20  percent  of the  previous
year's  tax  receipts. Second,  the  French  government  guaranteed  the
convertibility  of the  CFA  Franc. Member  countries  had to  convert  65  percent
of their  foreign  exchange  reserves  into  French  Francs  and deposit  them  with
the  French  Treasury. Third,  and  most relevant  to our study,  the  exchange  rate
between  the  French  and  CFA  Francs  was fixed  at 50  CFAF  - 1 FF,  the  rate  which
had  prevailed  since  1948.  Changes  in  this  parity  required  the  unanimous
consent  of all Zone  members,  including  France. In  other  words,  the  rules  of
the  Zone  made a nominal  devaluation  virtually  impossible.
While  other  aspects  of the  CFA Zone  have  changed  over  the  last  30 years,
these  three  rules  have  remained  intact. Several  studies  have asked  whether
the  rules  have :ad  to a difference  in the  economic  performance  of Zone  members
vis-a-vis  some group  of "comparator"  countries. Devarajan  and  de Melo (1987)
showed  that  CFA countries  had  a slightly  higher  growth  rate  of CDP than  their
sub-Saharan  African  (hereafter  "African")  counterparts  in the  period  1960-82.
Guillaumont  et al. (1988)  obtained  a similar  conclusion  by examining  a richer
set  of indicators. Both sets  of authors  attributed  the  differential
performance  to the  monetary  and  fiscal  discipline  engendered  by membership  in
the  CFA  Zone.
However,  in  updating  their  study  to include  the  1980s,  and  looking  at a
broader  set  of indicators,  Devarajan  and  de  Melo (1990)  arrived  at more
equivocal  results. While  CFA countries  continued  to enjoy  a slightly  higher
GDP growth  rate than  their  hfrican  neighbors,  this  difference  was  no longer-7-
statistically  significant  for the  1980s. Furthermore,  along  some  other
dimensions,  the  CFA  Zone's  performance  was  noticeably  worse.  CFA  countries
had lower  export  growth  and investment  levels  in the  1980s  compared  with  other
African  countries. When  controlling  for  the  size  of the  external  shocks  faced
by these  groups  of countries,  Devarajan  and  de Melo found  that  CFA  countries
achieved  less  current  account  reduction  than  their  African  neighbors.
Moreover,  they  experienced  greater  variability  in  growth  than  non-CFA
countries. 6 On one  dimension,  however,  the  CFA  countries  continued  to shine:
their  average  inflation  rate  was roughly  half that  of other  African  countries
in the  1970s,  and one-seventh  that  of these  countries  in  the  1980s.
Furthermore,  the  degree  of inflation-reduction  between  the  1970s  and  1980s,
controlling  for  external  shockn,  was  significantly  higher  in the  CFA  Zone  than
outside  it.
In sum,  both the  rules  of the  CFA  Zone  and the  performance  of its  members
make it an ideal  case  with  which  to study  the  pros  and cons  of fixed  exchange
rates. The  Zone  has  maintained  a fixed  parity  with the  French  franc
throughout  its  history. The relative  performance  of Zone  members  vis-a-vis
their  African  counterparts  illustrates  the  tradeoffs  involved. On the  one
hand,  Zone  members  enjoyed  lower  inflation  thanks  to the  fixed  exchange  rate
regime. OrL  the  other  hand,  they  have apparently  been  unable  to adjust  their
economies  to the  large  terms  of trade  shocks  of the  1980s  and  have experienced
greater  variability  in  output. One  reason,  no doubt,  is their  inability  to
use  nominal  devaluations  as an instrument  of adjustment. Finally,  the
comparison  between  CFA  and  other  African  countries  is  especially  apt.  For  the-8-
other  African  countries  share  most  of the  salient  features  with the  CFA  Zone
except  the  fixed  exchange  rate.  They  obtained  independence  at similar  times
and  are roughly  at the  same level  of development. All are  primary  producers,
as are  the  CFA  members.  Since  they  produce  similar  goods,  they  faced  the  same
external  shocks  as the  CFA  cou..tries  during  this  period. In short,  the  other
African  countries  provide  CFA  members  with a relatively  accurate  picture  of
"life  outside  the  Zone". The  fact  that  these  two  groups  of countries  are
distinguished  by exchange  rata  regime  brings  us as close  to  a controlled
experiment  as economists  could  hope for.
III.  The Framework
The  experience  of the  CFA  Zone  illustrates  the  main tradeoff  invo ied  in
the  choice  of exchange  rate  regimes  as indicated  in section  I: By committing
themselves  to a fixed-rate  regime,  these  countries  could  anchor  their  price
levels  and  maintain  inflation  close  to the  rate  experienced  by the  country
whose  currency  serves  as the  peg.  However,  by doing  so they  lost  the  ability
to adjust  to terms  of trade  shocks. Had  they  selected  a flexible-rate  regime,
they  would  have  been able  to limit  the  damage  done to the  real  economy  by the
ups  and  down in the  world  prices  of their  main imports  and  exports. That,  in
turn,  would  have come  at the  expense  of a higher  rate  of inflation,  as
domestic  wage and  price  setters  would  have lacked  the  discipline,  and  domestic
monetary  authorities  the  credibility,  provided  by an irrevocably  fixed
exchange  rate.7
Did thes_  countries  "do  the  right  thing"  by joining  a currency  union  with
France? We will set  u%p  a simple  model  here to  provide  a partial  answer  to-9-
this  question.
Assume  that  the  policymaker  is interested  in  maximizing  an objective
function  in  which  both a nominal  and  a real  variable  play  a role.  The  real
variable  could  be the  current  account,  output,  or the  growth  rate. The
nominal  variable  could  be the  price  level  or inflation. Since  presumably  what
matters  most to  policymakers  are  growth  and  inflation,  we will cast  the  model
in terms  of these  two  variables. We express  the  objective  function  in
quadratic-loss  form:
(1)  W _  - ((f - *)2 +  (y -Y*)2
where  W denotes  welfare,  ff  is inflation,  y is the  growth  rate,  0  is the  weight
attached  by the  authorities  to the  real  target  relative  to the  nominal  one,
and  i* and  y  are  the  policy  maker's  targets  for inflation  and  growth,
respectively. (&I  can  of course  hb zero.) A  welfare  maximum  is  attained  when
inflation and growth hit their target levels (if  - wf  and y  - y*).8 The
quadratic-loss  formulation  has  well-known  problems,  chief  among  which  is its
symmetric  treatment  of over-  and  under-shooting  of  targets. But  for  our
purposes,  such  problems  are  of  secondary  importance.
The  equilibrium  level  of  growth  is determined  by two  variables,  the
change  in the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  terms  of  trade:
(2)  y-  + a(e - p) + (r  - r),
where  y is the (exogenously  given)  "natural"  rate  of  growth,  e and  p are (log
differences  in)  the  exchange  rate  and the  home-goods  price,  respectively,  r is-10-
the (log)  terms  of trade,  and r  is  the  mean level  of the  (log)  terms  of
trade. The parameters  a  and  P  are  positive. The terms  of tLade,  r,  is  taken
to  be random,  wi'h variance  a2.  Note that (e-p)  stands  for  the  percentage
change  in the  real  exchange  rate.  An equation  like ,')  follows  from
expressing  the level  of output  as a function  of the  level  of the  real  exchange
rate  and the  terms  of trade.
To complete  the  model,  we have to specify  how  domestic  prices  are
determined. We assume  tnat  domestic  price  (or  wage)  setters  are  rational  and
forward-looking,  but that  they  can change  their  prices  less  frequently  than
the  authorities  can  adjust  tl'..  exchange  rate.  Domestic  prices  are  therefore
set  taking  into  account  the  government's  exchange  rate  policy,  but  without
actually  observing  the  exchange  rate  that  will  prevail. This  provides  policy
makers  in  principle  temporary  leeway  in  determining  the  real  exchange  rate  by
altering  the  nominal  exchange  rate.  Further,  we assume  that terms  of trade
shocks  are  revealed  after  domestic  prices  are  set. The timing  therefore  is  as
follows:
1.  p is set;
2.  r  is  revealed;
3. e is  set.
We assume  that  domestic  price  setters  (e.g.,  urban  workers)  are rational
and forward-looking.  In  setting  their  prices,  they  are  concerned  both  with
maintaining  their  relative  prices  and  with adjusting  to shocks. In reduced
form,  their  behavior  can  be summarized  by expressing  the  change  in domestic
prices  as follows:-11-
(3)  p - E(e)  + wE(r - r),
where  E(x) stands  for  the  expected  value  of x.  The  first  term  here  captures
the  relative-price  motive, 9 while  the  second  term  captures  the  desired
adjustment  in  home  prices  in response  to the  expected  terms-of-trade  shock.
(w  is a parameter  representing  the  elasticity  of the  desired  adjustment  with
respect  to the  shock.) Note that  p is set  before  r is  revealed,  and  E(r
- 0.  Therefore,  (3)  boils  down  to:
(4)  p - E(e).
Hence,  home-goods  prices  (or,  equivalently,  wages)  increase  at the  expected
rate  of nominal  depreciation.
Finally,  inflation  is  a weighted  average  of the  increases  in the  prices
of home goods  and  traded  goods: 10
(5)  ir  - jup  +  (l-M)e.
We are  now ready  to analyze  the  behavior  of the  economy  under  the  two  exchange
rate  regimes.
(a)  Fixed  Exchange  Rates.  The  analysis  of this  case  is  very simple. Under
fixed  exchange  rates,  the  government  irrevocably  fixes  the  value  of the
currency,  giving  up its  discretionary  ier  to alter  it.  As mentioned  above,
rational  expectations  in this  context  imply  p - E(e).  Given  the inflation
target  of w*, then,  the  optimal  policy  for  the  government  is to set  e --12-
This gives:
p - E(e) - e - .
That in turn  implies  that  the  equilibrium  value  of the  real  variable  is
(6)  y  - y  +  p(r  -r).
Under  this  policy  regime,  then,  inflation  stays  on target  while  growth
fluctuates  with the  terms  of trade.
(b)  Flexible  Exchange  Rates. Under  flexible  rates,  the  government  behaves  in
a  discretionary  manner  and determines  the  value  of  e to  maximize  its  objective
function  as expressed  in (1). When it does  so,  it takes  home-goods  prices  (p)
as given  (as  they  have  been  pre-set). Moreover,  having  observed  the  terms  of
trade,  it selects  an exchange  rate that  is  contingent  on the  realized  value  of
T.  Substituting  (2)  and (5)  into  (1),  we can  write  the  objective  function  in
terms  of e,  p, and  r:
W(e, p, r) - -[pp +(l-p)e  - r*I 2
-[(Ky*)  +  a(e-p) +  r  2
Maximizing  this  expression  and  solving  for  e yields:
(7)  e - (a2  +  (1-p)21-1 ([a 20 _  p(l-p)]p  +  (l-p),r*  + ag(y*_y)  -aor-
Assuming  that  the  policymaker  places  sufficient  weight  on the  real  target
(growth)  so that  a20 - (-p)]  >  0,  we get  the  following  results:
(i)  de/dr  <  0;-13- 
(ii)  1  >  de/dp >  0;
(iii)  de/dir*>  0;
(iv) de/d(y*-y)  >  0.
For  ease of exposition,  assume  an initial  equilibrium  where  e  - p - 0.
The  first  of these  inequalities  states  that  the  policymaker  will react  to
terms  of trade  shocks  by compensatory  exchange  rate  policy;  a deterioration  in
the terms  of trade  will be met  by a depreciation.  This is of course  the  main
advantage  of flexibility  in the  exchange  rate  regime. The second  result
states  that  an increase  in  home-goods  prices  will  be accommodated  by a
depreciation,  but only  partially. The reason  for  the  partial  accommodation  is
the inflationary  cost  of depreciation.  Third,  a reduction  in the  target  value
of inflation  will call for  an appreciation  of the  currency.
The  fourth  result  links  exchange-rate  policy  to the  relationship  between
the  government's  target  for  growth  and  the  natural  level  of growth. When  the
government  has an expansionary  motive  (y  > y), exchange-rate  policy  will
have  a bias towards  depreciation.  For  the  rest  of the  analysis,  we will
assume  that  this is indeed  the  case.  There  are  two  possible  justifications
for  this.  First,  for  many  reasons,  we could  think  that the  economy's  natural
rate  of growth  is sub-optimal  from  a social  standpoint.  That could  be due to
pre-existing  rigidities  in labor  markets  or various  kinds  of distortionary
(and  unremovable)  taxation. The  government's  desire  to push  the  economy
beyond  the  rate  at  which the  economy  would  settle  on its  own, then,  would  be a
well-meaning  response  to this  sub-optimality.  The  second  justification  is-14-
based  on a much less  benign  view.  In this  view, the  bias  towards  depreciation
derives  from  naughty  motives:  gaining  political  advantage  by giving  the
economy  a temporary  boost,  or allowing  inflationary  finance  of budget
deficits.
Under  rational  expectations,  domestic  price  setters  will take into
account  the  government's  behavior,  as captured  by equation  (7). Setting  p -
E(e)  and  taking  the  expectation  of (7),  we can  derive  the  following  expression
for  the  expected  change  in  the  exchange  rate (and  therefore  the  level  of  home-
goods  prices):
(8)  E(e)  - p - fA  +  [aO/(l-p)](y*  -
where  we have used the  fact  that  E(r  - r) - 0.  This is the  rule followed  by
the  private  sector  in setting  p.  Note that  home-goods  inflation  will  be
higher,  the  greater  the  divergence  between  the  target  level  of growth  and  its
natural  level. That is  because  price  setters  will  want to cover  themselves
against  currency  depreciations  that  erode  their  relative  prices. In turn,  the
equilibrium  level  of depreciation  of the  exchange  rate  will  be (by  plugging
[8]  into [7]):
(9)  e - f* +  [aO/(l-j)](y* - y) - 2a  p/  .a  +  - r).
Note that (9)  differs  from (8)  only  by the  last  term,  which  is the  terms  of
trade  shock  that  cannot  be anticipated  by price  setters. Therefore,  domestic
price  behavior  fully  takes  into  account  the  systematic  component  of exchange
rate  policy  (the  part  due to the  gap  between  y  and  y),  which  implies  that-15-
the government's expansionary motive creates only inflation and no output
gains.
But discretionary policy does buy the economy something, and that is the
ability to alter the real exchange rate (and  hence smooth output) in the face
of unanticipated terms of trade disturbances.  This can be seen by solving for
the equilibrium level of y:
(10) y =  y +  {(ls)2/[IC2,  +(l-p) 2])fi(r  - r).
Since {(l-,s) 2/[ac 20 +(1-0)2]) <  1, exchange rate flexibility enables growth to
be less sensitive to fluctuations in the terms of trade than in the fixed
exchange rate case (as can be seen by comparing [10]  with [6]).
(c) Welfare Comparison of the Two Policy Regimes.  Table 1 summarizes the
inflation and growth consequences of the two policy regimes.  The fixed
exchange-rate regime does better on the inflation front (on average), while
the flexible-rate regime does better on the real side of the economy by
reducing the fluctuations in growth rate.  The next step is to derive an
explicit cost-benefit criterion for choosing between the two regimes.-16-
Table  1: Consequences  of the  Alternative  Policy  Regimes
growth  inflation
fixed  y +  B(r-r)  *
exch  rate
flexible  Y +  t(l-A) 2/[a 20 +(1  ,)2]1)  *+  [a/(l-)(y*-y)
exch rate  x  )(r-r)  -0)/[a  +(l-,.)2)(r-r)
The appropriate  way to  do so is to take  an ex-ante  stand  and  ask:  which
of the  two  regimes  provides  a  higher  level  of expected  welfare,  in light  of
the  structure  of the  economy,  policy  preferences  of the  authorities,  and the
anticipated  pattern  of exogenous  (in  this  case  terms  of trade)  shocks? It is
possible  to answer  this  question  using  the  results  obtained  so far. For each
policy  regime,  we can  plug the  equilibrium  outcomes  for  y and r into  the
objective  function  (1)  and  take  the  mathematical  expectation.
Let  us denote  expected  welfare  under  the  fixed  exchange-rate  regime  by
EWf  and  the  corresponding  variable  under  the  flexible  exchange-rate  regime  by-17-
EWnf.  Then after some algebra and simplification, the difference between the
two can be expressed as:
(11) EWf - EWnf  - a2 2A,  with
(12)  A  - [(y -y)/(l-p)]12  -2  2/[a2' +  ('-j)21
We will refer to (EWf - EWnf) as the net benefits of the fixed rate regime.
The composite parameter A  is of ambiguous sign, reflecting the tradeoff
between the costs and benefits of the two regimes.  The first term making up A
captures the benefit of the fixed-rate regime, while the second term
represents the cost.  A fixed rate is preferable to a flexible rate regime
whenever A  is positive.
Note first that the variance of the terms of trade (a2) enters on the
cost side.  That is, the higher is a2, the less likely that a fixed rate
regime will be preferable to a flexible rate regime.  Second, the higher is
(y* - y) the more likely that a fixed exchange rate will be desirable.  This
follows from the greater temptation of policy makers with expansionary
ambitions to inflate the economy (and  depreciate the currency).  A fixed
exchange rate rules out such depreciation, and leaves policy makers better
off, even when judged by their own welfare criterion.  Third, a high P  makes
flexible rates more desirable.  That is, when the real economy is highly
susceptible to terms of trade shocks, flexible exchange rates have the edge.11
Next, we turn to the effect of 0.  It can be verified that:
d(EWf - EWnf)/do >  0  whenever A  >  0;  and
d(EWf - EWnf)/do  <  O  whenever A <  0.-18-
In words, when a fixed rate is preferable (A  >  0), an increase in the weight
placed on the real target makes a fixed rate regime even more beneficial.
When a flexible-rate regime is preferable (A  <  0), an increase in the weight
attached to the real target has ambiguous effects on the net benefits.  With
respect to A  itself, we can see from (12) that dA/do is unambiguously
positive: that is, there must exist a sufficiently high 4 such that a fixed
rate regime becomes preferable to a flexible rate one.  This may sound
paradoxical, because the benefit of a fixed-rate regime is lower inflation,
not higher growth.  But it is an extension of the same logic: when policy
makers put a large weight on output relative to inflation, there will be
greater temptation to abuse the discretion allowed by flexible exchange rates
and a higher inflationary cost.  Countries where economic policy is highly
politicized, where the central bank lacks autonoray,  or where inflation has
becon.m  chronic and its perceived costs low are settings where we would expect
^  and (y -y) to be high.
In the preceding paragraph, we looked at the relationship between 0  and
the choice of policy regimes while holding constant all other parameters, and
(y*-y) in particular.  An alternative approach, and one that we will rely on
in our empirical analys:s, is to ask how the choice of policy regimes is
affected by variations in X, while holding the inflation differential between
the two regimes constant.  From Table 3.1, we can see that the average
inflation differential under the two regimes is given by:
(13)  lnf  - rf  - [cr/(l-9)](y  -y)-19-
where  the  subscripts  "nf"  and  "f"  once  again  refer  to the flexible  and fixed
regimes,  respectively.  This implies
2  *2  2
[a+/(l-jAfl(y  -y)  - (inf - rf)
Substituting  into (11)  we get:
(11')  EWf - EWnf - (fnf - ff)2  (aop)2a2/[a2  +  (1-A)2]
It can  be shown  that  the  second  term  on the  right-hand  side  is increasing  in
*.  Thus, holding  (lnf  E-  tf)  constant, EWf - EWnf is decreasing in 4.
Therefore,  controlling  for  the  inflation  differential,  an increase  in the
weight  placed  on the  real target  renders  fixed  rates  less  advantageous.  Note
that  controlling  for  the inflation  differential  means  in this  context
adjusting  (y -y)  pari  passu  with  g$ to maintain  the  difference  between  the
inflation  rates  fixed (see  [13]).
We will use the  formulation  in (11')  when  we turn to the  empirical
application  to the  CFA  case.  The  reason  is tiat  we can get  a rough  handle  on
the inflation  differential  under  the  two  regimes  by comparing  CFA  Zone
countries  with other  sub-Saharan  countries  with flexible  exchange  rates.  By
contrast,  (y*  y) is  unobservable.
IV.  The  Tradeoffs:  Emoirical  Application  to the  CFA  Zone
As we mentioned  earlier,  there  are  at least  two  reasons  why a  model  like
that  described  above  is  relevant  and applicable  to the  case  of the  CFA  Zone.
First,  since  CFA  Zone  countries  are  highly  dependent  on  primary  exports,  terms-20-
of trade  snocks  are the  main  exogenous  force  that  buffets  their  economies.
Therefore  our focus  on the  terms  of trade  would  appear  well  placed. Second,
the  presence  of neighboring  countries  with similar  economic  structures  but
different  exchange  rate  regimes  allows  us to construct  a reasonable
counterfactual.  In  particular,  we can  derive  some  ballpark  estimates  of the
inflationary  cost of exchange-rate  flexibility  by looking  at the  experience  of
these  comparator  countries.
We proceed  as follows. We first  note that  the  choice  of a fixed  exchange
rate  regime  implies  a certain  preference  for  price-stability  over  the  real
target  (or,  in the  language  of the  model  in section  III,  a  particular  value  of
0  in  the  objective  function  [1]). We then  ask:  Given  the  evolution  of these
economies  and  of their  external  terms  of trade,  what  does the  fact  that  they
joined  the  CFA Zone  say  about  their  revealed,  ex ante  valuation  of the  output-
inflation  tradeoff? Finally,  we compare  the  range  of revealed  output-
inflation  tradeoffs  we obtain  in this  manner  with  what  we consider  to be
"reasonable"  tradeoffs.
We proceed  by determining  the  critical  level  of 0  at which  the  policy
maker  would  be indifferent  between  fixed  and  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes.
As discussed  in the  previous  section,  it is convenient  to work  with equation
(11'). Setting  this  equation  equal  to zero  and  solving  for  q, we obtain  the
critical  value  of C,  O.  This  critical  rate is  a function  of the  inflation
differential  under  fixed  and flexible  rates (rnf  - rf),  as  well as the  other
parameters  of the  model. As implied  by the  earlier  discussion,  Xc is
increasing  in the inflation  differential  and  decreasing  in  a2.  In  words,  as-21-
the inflation  cost  of exchange-rate  flexibility  rises,  the  weight  placed  on
the  real target  must increase  for  the  policy  maker  to remain  at the  same
margin  of indifference.  Conversely,  as the  terms  of trade  become  more
variable,  the  weight  placed  on the  real  target  must diminish  for  continued
incifference.  Holding  everything  else  constant,  a X  higher  than  Xc would
imply  that  a flexible  exchange  rate  regime  would  be preferable  to a fixed  rate
regime. We now  proceed  to calculate  Xc.  We will need  empirical  estimates  of
all  the  other  parameters  in  equation  (11').
To get  a handle  on (lrnf  - wf),  we exploit  the  structural  similarity
between  the  CFA  member  countries  and  their  neighbors. That  is,  we use the
difference  between  the  average  inflation  rate  inside  the  CFA  Zone  and in the
rest  of sub-Saharan  Africa  as an estimate  of (wnf  - wf).  For the  GDP
deflator,  this  difference  is 15 percentage  points  (the  CFA  average  rate
between  1973  and  1987  was 9  percent,  the  non-CFA  average  24  percent). For  the
consumer  price  index,  the  difference  is  close  to 12  percentage  points. We use
a figure  which lies  in  between  these  two  differences,  with a slight  bias
towards  the  GDP  deflator:  13.8  percentage  points.
As for the  o2 term  in equation  (11'),  this is  obtained  by taking  the
(unweighted)  average  of the  variances  of the  logarithms  of the  terms  of trade
of all the  CFA  countries  during  1965-87. The  base  data and  the  variances  are
given  in  Table  2.  We also  present  the  levels  of o2 for  various  sub-periods
and individual  countries. With the former,  we can  ask  whether  the  terms  of
trade  have become  more volatile  so that the  decision  to fix the  exchange  rate
in 1965  no longer  makes  sense. With the  latter,  we calculate  the  revealed-22-
inflation-output  tradeoffs  for  individual  countries  to see  if Zone  membership
continues  to  be optimal  for  some  countries  but  not others.
The  parameters  a, 6  and  p  are  difficult  to  estimate  precisely. Hence,  we
vary them  parametrically  in  our calculations.  The  parameter  a  represents  the
increase  in  growth  for  an additional  one  percent  depreciation  of the  real
exchange  rate.  We vary this  from  a low  of 0.05  to a high  of 0.20 in  our
sensitivity  tests. Note that  a  - 0.20 implies  that  a ten  percent  real
depreciation  will spur  growth--temporarily--by  two  percentage  points. The
parameter  i  is the impact  of a terms  of trade  shock  on real  income, As a
first  approximation,  the  direct  effect  of the  shock  will  be to reduce  real
income  by the share  of imports  in GDP.  Note  that  this  share  is  also linked  to
(1-A),  the  share  of tradables  in the  price  index. Under  some  conditions,  the
two  are equal  (see  Devarajan,  Lewis  and  Robinson  [1991]). Therefore,  we set
1->  - 6  in  our calculations  and  vary  P  from  0.10 to  0.40.
One last  step  is needed  before  we can interpret  our  calculations. It
will  be convenient  to state  our  results  in terms  of implied  output-inflation
tradeoffs,  rather  than  4S itself. The tradeoff  can  be recovered  from  Xc by
calculating  the  marginal  rate  of substitution  between  w and  y along  an
indifference  curve  (i.e.,  holding  dW  - 0).  Differentiating  the  objective
function  (1):
(14)  dw/dyIdW_.0 )
This gives  us the  revealed  inflation-output  tradeoff  along  the  locus  on which
the  country  would  have been indifferent  between  a fixed  and flexible  exchange-23-
rate  regime. Remember  that  Oc is  the  maxm  for  which  fixed  rates  still
make sense  (holding  the inflation  differential  and  other  parameters  constant).
There!ore  the  expression  dr/dyldw_O  answers  the  following  question:  what is
the  maiimum  increase  in inflation  that the  government  is revealed  to  be
willing  to trade  off  against  a single  percentage  point  increase  in growth,
given  that  it  has chosen  to  join the  CFA  Zone?
In order  to map the  values  of  Xc to this  inflation-output  tradeoff,  we
*  *
need to  know y, y ,  s  and  if  in (14). It is reasonable  to take  as the target
.level  of inflation,  ,*  - 0.  For  the  actual  level,  we take  w - 0.08,  which  is
about  the  average  for  CFA  countries  throughout  the  post-independence  period.
The target  GDP growth  rate (y*)  is  taken  to  be 0.05,  which  is  at the  lower  end
of the range  of targets  in the (usually  optimistic)  Five-Year  Plans  of thse
countries. The  actual  (y)  will  be 0.03,  which  is about  the  average
performance  of CFA countries  in this  period.
Incorporating  these  assumptions,  Table  3  presents  the  revealed  inflation-
output  tradeoffs  for  the  countries  which  chose  to join  the  fixed  exchange  rate
regime. Note that for  most  values  of a  and  0,  the  implied  tradeoff  between
growth  and inflation  is  exceedingly  steep. For  example,  when  a  - 0.15  and  p  -
0.25,  dw/dyldW_O  is 1.51.  The  interpretation  is that  for  the  decision  to  join
the  CFA  Zone to  have  made sense  (given  these  particular  values  of a  and  P),
member  countries  should  have  been  willing  to tolerate  no  more than  a one and  a
half percentage  point increase  in inflation  for  a one  percent  increase  in
their  average  annual  GDP  growth  rate.  In other  words,  the  implied  preference
for  price  stabilit)  over  output  is  extremely  high.  If they  were  willing  to-24-
tolerate  a  higher  inflation  rate  for  this  boost in  their  growth  rate,  they
should  not  have opted  for  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime.
The  revealed  tradeoff  is  even  steeper  for  a country  like  Gabon,  which
suffered  the  largest  terms  of trade  shocks  in  the  CFA  Zone (see  Table  2).
This is intuitive. The  costs  of a fixed  exchange  rate  regime  rise  with the
variance  of the  terms  of trade. For  Gabon  to  have joined  the  CFA  Zone,
therefore,  it  must  have had  an exceptionally  low  tolerance  for inflation  vis-
a-vis  growth  (see  second  panel  of Table  3).  Likewise,  Senegal's  tradeoff  is
the least  steep,  because  it  enjoyed  the  lowest  variance  in its  terms  of trade
(bottom  panel  of Table  3).
Sensitivity  analysis  with the  inflation  differential  (not  reported  here)
does  not significantly  alter  the  results. For  example,  raising  the  inflation
differential  to its  "high"  estimate,  15 percentage  points,  raises  Senegal's
tradeoff  for  the intermediate  values  of a  and 6  (0.15  and  0.25,  respectively)
to 6.4  percentage  points. That is,  eve- if the  gains  from  joining  the  Zone
were 15 percentage  points  lower  average  inflation,  the  Senegalese  revealed
that  they  were only  willing  to tradeoff  6.4  percentage  points  of inflation  for
one  percentage  point increase  in  their  GDP  growth  rate.
Our impression  is that  most  African  policymakers  would  be willing  to
trade  up to about  10  percentage  points  of inflation  for  a one  percentage  point
increase  in  their  GDP growth  rate--that  is,  to increase  their  growth  from  3 to
4 percent  per annum  on average. Given  that  most of the  numbers  in  Table  3 lie
below this  figure,  it  appears  that  the  decision  to  join  the  CFA  Zone  reflects
an excessive  anti-inflation  bias.  Put  another  way, if  the  future  is  going  to-25-
be anything  like the  past,  CFA countries  should  perhaps  seriously  evaluate
whether  they  wish to remain  in a fixed  exchange  rate  regime.
V. Concluding  Remarks
We should  stress  that  we have concentrated  here on only  some  aspects  of
the  costs  and  benefits  of the  CFA  Zone. We have ignored  some important
benefits,  including  the  savings  obtained  by pooling  reserves  and the
attractiveness  to foreign  investors  of a convertible  currency.  In  addition,  we
have left  unmentioned  the  special  relationship  with France  (and  the  French
treasury)  implied  by the  existence  of the  Zone.  Depending  on one's
perspective,  the  latter  consideration  can  be viewed  as either  a net  gain or
loss.
Our focus  instead  has  been on the  costs  of maintaining  a fixed  exchange
rate regime  in the  context  of highly  variable  external  terms  of trade. We
have attempted  to  measure  the  welfare  costs  arising  from  the  inability  to
adjust  the  exchange  rate,  and to  pit these  costs  against  the  benefits  of lower
inflation. The inflation  differential  between  CFA  and  non-CFA  African
countries  has  been around  14 percentage  points. We attribute  this
differential  to the  standard  time-consistency  problem  inherent  in
discretionary  macroeconomic  policy. Nonetheless,  our  highly  stylized
calculations  suggest  that fixed  exchange  rates  have  been,  on the  whole,  a  bad
bargain  for  the  CFA  member  countries. For  most  of the  CFA  members.  the
inflation  benefits  do not  appear  to  have  been large  enough  to offset  the  costs
on the  output  side.  Under  "reasonable"  output-inflation  tradeoffs,  these
countries  would  have  been  better  off  having  the  flexibility  to adjust  to-26-
external  shocks.
This  conclusion  needs  one  important  caveat. Our counterfactual
effectively  assumes  that  CFA  policy  makers  would  have followed  the  appropriate
exchange  rate  policies  in response  to terms  of trade  shocks,  had they  had the
freedom  to do so.  In light  of experience  with exchange  rate  policy  in the
rest  of  Africa,  this is  perhaps  a doubtful  supposition. Possibly,  exchange-
rate  flexibility  would  have  brought  only inflation,  and  no output  benefits.
However,  basing  the  choice  of an exchange  rate  regime  on the  assumed
incompetence  of policymakers  does  not seem  very appropriate  either.-27-
NOTES
1.  See  Aghevli  et al. (1991)  for  a concise  summary  of the  issues.
2.  This is  of course  closely  related  to the  literature  on "rules  versus
discretion". See  Fischer  (1990)  for  a general  survey.
3.  The  countries  are:  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Cameroon,  Central  African
Republic,  Chad,  Congo,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Gabon,  Mali,  Niger,
Senegal  and Togo.  Mali left  the  Zone  in 1965  and rejoined  in  1984.
Equatorial  Guinea  became  a member  in 1985.
4.  Togo did  not join at the  outset,  but did  so after  a change  of government
in 1963.
5.  For  more detailed  descriptions  of the  institutional  arrangements  in the
CFA Zone,  see  Bhatia  (1985)  and  Guillaumont  and  Guillaumont  (1984).
6.  The  unweighted  average  of the  standard  deviation  of growth  for  the  CFA
countries  is  7.2  percentage  points  over  the  entire  1973-87  period. The
comparable  average  for  other  African  countries  is 5.4  percentage  points.
7.  Our  approach  is somewhat  related  to that  taken  in  the literature  on the
insulating  properties  of fixed  and  flexible  exchange  rates  in the  presence  of
domestic  and  external  shocks  of different  kinds (see  for  example  Boyer,  1978,
and  Aizenman  and Frenkel,  1985). However,  this  literature  focused  on the  goal
of stabilizing  output  only,  and  neglected  the  price  discipline  argument  for
fixed  rates.
8.  With a slight  reinterpretation  of variables,  the  model  can  also  be stated
in terms  of the  levels  of output  and  prices,  rather  than  their  growth  rates.-28-
We chose  the  latter  because  they  are  the  more relevant  variables  for  policy.
9.  There  is actually  a slight  conceptual  problem  here.  Since  p and e stand
for the  changes  in the  exchange  rate  and  home prices,  the  relative-price
motive  is stated  in  proportional,  r  :her  than  absolute,  form. This implies
that  price  setters  let  bygones  be bygones,  and  do not  attempt  to make  up for
previous  losses  (or  gains). Tracking  these  dynamic  effects  would  complicate
the  model  considerably.
10.  Note that  inflation  has  no direct  effect  on the  equilibrium  gro-ith  rate
(2). Of course,  in  the long  run,  persistent  inflation  will  undermine  economic
activity  and  growth,  which  is  one  of the  reasons  why inflation  is included
separately  in the  objective  function  (1).
11.  $  is likely  to  be large  in economies  that  are  very open.  Openness
therefore  increases  the  desirability  of flexibility  in  exchange  rates. This
is  at odds  with the  usual  conclusion  drawn  in  the literature  on optimum
currency  areas,  wherein  greater  openness  is taken  to imply  less  latitude  in
manipulating  the  real  exchange  rate through  changes  in the  nominal  rate,
making  flexibility  less  desirable.-29-
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Terms  of  Trade  in  the  CFA  Zone
(1980-100)
BEN  BKF  CMR  CAF  COG  CIV  GAB  MLI  NER  SEN  TGO
1965  132  132  104  123  98  101  59  146  144  133  103
1966  124  144  106  118  93  100  60  146  170  136  100
1967  129  147  109  110  103  98  45  157  154  90  103
1968  131  153  120  118  90  105  33  158  159  112  104
1969  126  147  125  132  89  107  30  171  155  124  103
1970  125  161  119  100  83  106  28  181  157  114  100
1971  108  158  98  92  81  88  29  172  164  106  90
1972  117  155  97  90  71  89  36  169  170  110  86
1973  177  178  114  98  42  96  35  182  150  103  93
1974  116  108  93  86  70  93  70  112  125  128  177
1975  94  94  79  73  64  80  62  101  128  118  145
1976  124  119  117  103  69  115  66  129  134  114  125
1977  152  110  147  115  72  146  64  1'20  125  113  117
1978  128  107  120  96  67  121  61  120  135  101  99
1979  115  108  104  104  74  118  72  105  122  100  93
1980  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  X00  100  100  100
1981  103  89  98  88  106  85  107  93  100  102  102
1982  92  83  96  90  101  87  102  ,83  104  98  93
1983  95  95  94  89  96  92  95  93  107  99  88
1984  97  95  96  95  97  100  95  i93  100  101  92
1985  92  81  92  87  94  96  90  t82  99  97  86
1986  67  76  62  85  57  105  56  74  94  86  72
1987  86  88  56  84  64  88  64  85  83  90  77
lOO*Variance[Log(Terms  of  Trade)]
Period  CFA  Avg
65-87  4.10  6.31  4.40  1.99  5.06  1.73  18.30  8.15  4.49  1.44  3.55  5.41
65-72  0.38  0.34  0.80  1.71  1.20  0.50  8.57  0.54  0.27  1.55  0.46  1.48
73-79  3.60  3.54  3.43  1.84  3.17  3.41  5.35  3.29  0.42  0.72  5.13  3.08
80-87  1.53  0.83  2.49  0.25  3.93  0.54  4.04  0.95  0.14  0.27  1.24  1.47
Source:  World  Bank  t1990]Table  3
Revealed  Inflation-Growth  Tradeoffs
Maximum  Increases  in Inflation  that  CFA  Countries  Are  Willing  to
Sustain  for  a One  Percent  Increase  in their  Average  Annual  GDP
Growth  Rate,  As Revealed  by their  Membership  in a Fixed  Exchange
Rate  Regime
(in percentage  points)
CFA  Zone
alPha  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.20
beta  0.10  9.71  9.04  8.91  8.86
0.15  4.74  4.15  4.02  3.97
0.20  2.95  2.43  2.31  2.26
0.25  2.08  1.62  1.51  1.47
0.30  1.59  1.18  .. 08  1.04
0.35  1.28  0.91  .82  0.78
0.40  1.07  0.74  .64  0.61
Gabon
alpha  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.20
beta  0.10  3.37  2.83  t.71  2.66
0.15  1.80  1.37  p.26  1.22
0.20  1.19  0.84  p.75  0.71
0.25  0.89  0.59  p.51  0.47
0.30  0.70  0.45  0.37  0.34
0.35  0.58  0.36  0.29  0.26
0.40  0.49  0.30  0.24  0.21
Senegal
alpha  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.20
beta  0'.10  34.10  33.38  33.24  33.19
0115  15.67  14.97  14.84  14.79
0.20  9.18  8.53  8.39  8.35
0.25  6.16  5.54  5.41  5.36
0.30  4.50  3.92  3.19  3.74
0'.35  3.48  2.94  2.81  2.77
0.40  2.81  2.30  2.18  2.13
Notes:  Assumptions:
U*  =  0
n  =0.08
y  0.05
y  5  0.03PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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